Don't aid Somalia, Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (1982)
Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, a Somali psychologist and Fanon scholar wrote a NYT article warning the US against aiding the Barre regime.
You may have noticed that I’ve been absent for a while, so I’d like to start by reassuring those who aren’t in regular contact with me that all is well. Over the past few months, I’ve been working alongside a group of friends to develop Geeska (The Horn or The Corner in Somali), a website dedicated to publishing articles covering all aspects of life in east Africa (from Kampala to Djibouti City, and Nairobi to Khartoum). The site offers content in three languages—Somali, Arabic, and English—and I encourage anyone interested in exploring this type of content to follow their accounts on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. We focus on platforming writers from the region bringing their own perspectives and stories to our readers.
This instalment was actually inspired by a piece published on Geeska a few weeks ago by Tarek Younis, a senior lecturer in psychology at Middlesex University on the academic research of Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan, a Somali psychologist and scholar who wrote an extraordinary book on Franz Fanon and the “psychology of oppression”. Bulhan came to my attention through a post on X by Younis who lauded his book on Fanon’s revolutionary ideas as “one of the best” he’d read but added that one of the reason’s we don’t know more about Bulhan’s work on Fanon is because of “where he’s based”. Indeed, Bulhan moved by to Hargeisa where he has taught for many years as the founder of the Franz Fanon University. Here is a line from Bulhan’s book, reflecting on the responsibilities of the psychologist when facing rabid colonial powers:
“Indeed, the greed that consumed other peoples and hoarded earthly resources may soon cannibalize itself before conquering outer space. Yet, what have psychologists said and done about this historical rampage and potential self-annihilation?”
Bulhan is clearly a fascinating academic, and in 1982 he wrote an article for the New York Times at a time when Somalia severed its ties with the USSR and attempted to align with the western bloc. This was a rather awkward and complex decision, which this blog has explored in depth. For those living in Somalia during that period, it meant that murals depicting Siad Barre alongside Karl Marx and Lenin were altered post-1977, leaving only Barre. “Only one of the trio has survived the realignment of power in the Horn of Africa which has dramatically affected this country of more than three million people,” wrote British journalist Alan Cowell. This shift followed Somalia’s feeling of betrayal when Moscow backed Ethiopia during the Ogaden War.
Bulhan, a critic of the Barre regime, was concerned that Mogadishu might secure backing from the United States as Barre was due to visit the White House and meet with then-president Ronald Reagan. Here is a clip from that meeting and it was awkward:
Mogadishu had already been receiving support from America’s Middle Eastern allies and smaller European powers, but securing US backing would provide Barre with a level of global legitimacy that he had not yet attained.
You can read the article here. It was published on March 1982:
When President Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia visits Washington next Tuesday, the Administration should treat him warily. More aid for Somalia, burdened with a staggering number of Ogaden refugees from the war with Ethiopia, and a tottering economy, may sound desirable to the White House. Mr. Siad Barre's offer of a base at Berbera, an Indian Ocean port near the troubled Persian Gulf, may appear attractive. But there is more involved than Mr. Siad Barre may care to admit in his talks with the Administration.
Any aid given to Mr. Siad Barre will strike most Somalis as open complicity with the most ruthless, cunning despot in their country's history. Further aid, especially arms or monetary loans, will only keep the lid on fulfillment of democratic aspirations of a nation divided, suppressed, and on the brink of civil war.
It would come when the refugee crisis is exacerbating a needless economic crisis, and when thousands are dying of malnutrition. Maj. Gen. Siad Barre came to power in 1969 in a military coup a week after President Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke was assassinated. Early, Mr. Siad Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council solemnly promised to soon hold free and fair elections; 13 years later, the elections have yet to take place.
The corruption that the regime was to stamp out has become a way of life. The nepotism and tribalism that Mr. Siad Barre promised to stem have reached enormous dimensions. Almost all key Government positions are now held by his clan and in-laws, though most of these officials are considered inept. In 1969, there were only four officers from his clan in the armed forces; it is now estimated that more than 60 percent of the officers are clan members.
Even more alarming is the imprisonment of thousands of people. Late last year, 30 young professionals -among them physicians, educators, economists, veterinarians - were rounded up and imprisoned for ''subversion.'' Their only ''crime'' is that they and other citizens of Hargeisa, having given up hope of service from the regime, cleaned up long-forgotten, filthy hospitals and schools themselves. These professionals, among the best-trained in Somalia and whose skills are badly needed, are being held incommunicado and tortured.
No less sinister are the summary executions of many military officers, religious leaders, and civil servants. There are now reports of mutiny and executions in some military garrisons.
The economy is in shambles. Food production has steadily declined since 1970. The export of bananas dropped from 116,000 metric tons in 1972 to a mere 34,000 metric tons in 1980. Mismanagement of public funds, embezzlement with impunity, and get-rich-quick schemes of Mr. Siad Barre's relatives further depleted a nearly exhausted treasury.
Recommendations by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund were ignored until last year when both refused to give loans without enactment of specific reforms.
If repression and corruption alone characterized the regime, the effect might have remained only a Somali tragedy. But Mr. Siad Barre has proved an unprincipled, untrustworthy partner in foreign relations, too. After the coup, he cuddled up to the Soviet Union, signed its first treaty of friendship in Africa, and provided it with the same base he now hopes to lease to the United States. (The Kremlin switched its support to Ethiopia during the war in 1977-78.) His early claim to champion ''scientific socialism'' was only a ploy; today, no country is more acutely aware of this than the Soviet Union.
His release of a few political prisoners last month is also a gimmick to convince Washington that he supports human rights, but the Somalis are no longer bemused by his duplicity. What he offers them is far from unifying leadership. The violence of his regime and his tribalist tactics are leading to civil war. Organized opposition has emerged: the Somali Salvation Front and the Somali Workers' Party, which are given sanctuary and support by Ethiopia, and the Somali National Movement, with headquarters in London and some Arab countries.
Indomitable optimists continue to hope for the day when compassion and respect for human rights will figure in the conduct of foreign policy. But for Washington more is involved in Somalia than compassion and rights; at risk is United States interests in the region.
The Horn of Africa is a cauldron of violence. An American base secured only with the consent of the unpopular Mr. Siad Barre augurs a repetition of problems arising from American support of dictators. The American people might ponder whether, in an already troubled region, they should cast their lot with a precarious despotism, or support the democratic aspirations of a nation abused, gagged, and ruled by force of arms.