"Siad Barre above all is a chauvinist": Fidel Castro on his meeting with the Somali leader
Castro was part of a delegation that visited Somalia and Ethiopia on the eve of Mogadishu's failed invasion in 1977
As the drums of war pounded in Mogadishu in the spring of 1977, Fidel Castro, president of Cuba and globally adored Marxist revolutionary, showed up in Somalia’s capital to mediate a solution between Somalia and Ethiopia. After visiting Siad Barre in Villa Somalia and touring the country, Castro went on to Ethiopia for the second leg of his trip, relaying messages from Siad Barre to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopia’s then embattled leader. He managed to persuade the two to meet in Aden, in the Soviet-aligned People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen before he travelled to East Germany, where he briefed the country’s leader, Erich Honecke, on his visit on the 3rd April 1977 in Berlin.
In his briefing Castro provided a detailed character assessment of the Somali leader following his failure to break any ground on limiting the possibility of conflict in the Horn of Africa. “I have made up my mind about Siad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist,” he told Honecke, according to minutes from their meeting. “Chauvinism is the most important factor in him. Socialism is just an outer shell that is supposed to make him more attractive.”
Barre had it easy until now, claimed Castro, providing a dim assessment of his political career from the colonial days til the coup:
“The Italians and the British made him a general. The revolution was accomplished in a minute, with hardly a shot fired. He put on a socialist face and got economic aid and weapons from the Soviet Union. His country is important strategically, and he likes prestige.
His good fortune meant Barre was “very convinced of himself.” Everything he touches turns to gold and in everything he did, he believed he was the best. “He is the greatest socialist; he cannot say ten words without mentioning socialism,” Castro told his East German counterpart.
In addition to his astute and detailed appraisal of Barre’s persona, which I think he shared just to give give his colleagues an understanding of the stakes in the Horn of Africa, Castro also shared details of his meetings with Mengistu Haile Mariam and Siad Barre. Barre told Castro in Aden, South Yemen, where they agreed to organise a face-to-face meeting between Mengistu and Barre, that he did not believe a genuine revolution had occurred in Ethiopia, hoping to keep Castro and the socialist bloc more broadly on his side. “He [Barre] told me that if Mengistu was a real revolutionary he should do as Lenin, and withdraw from his territory,” the Cuban leader reported.
Castro’s reading of the situation however put him off Somalia as his trip to both countries convinced him that Somalia was moving away from the socialist bloc and into the orbit of what he called the “imperialist countries.” He said: “The power and influence of the rightist group continue to increase. The Interior Minister, Suleiman, is doing everything possible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia and the imperialist countries.”
Ethiopia on the other hand, had undergone a bonafide revolution with land-reform and all the right slogans, concluded Castro. It had greater potential for him from the perspective of a doctrinaire socialist, they nevertheless attempted to find a way to resolve the issues between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.
In Aden, Cuba’s vice president, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was present for the meeting between the leaders. He proposed a commission be set up with representatives from both countries as the meeting drew on into the early hours. Siad Barre played along, and drafted the text outlining the scope of the work for the commission, mandating it to solve the outstanding territorial disputes. Mengistu, now very suspicious of Barre, rejected it outright. Castro asked if he really wanted a solution, to which Barre belligerently responded, “Mengistu would have to answer that.”
“I was faced with the complicated question of either speaking my mind about Siad Barre's position or keeping it to myself,” Castro reported to Honecke, as Barre had not only insulted Mengistu, but had also resorted to “subtle threats.” “I went on to say that we considered the events in Ethiopia as a revolution,” said Castro coming to Mengistu’s defence, “that the events of 3 February were a turning point, and that Mengistu is the leader of a profound transformation.” And though he played down the possibility of armed conflict erupting between the leaders, he didn’t totally rule it out. According to Castro’s recollection, Barre then took the floor. “He said that he would never want war and that as a socialist and revolutionary he would never take this path.” Those assurances, much like assurances Somali officials had given to other leaders didn’t in the end count for much, as three months later Somali troops were racing through the Ogaden desert with Soviet acquired military equipment.
In one of his final remarks on the matter, Castro’s words were prophetic. “The socialist countries are faced with a problem,” he told Honecke solemnly. “If they help Ethiopia, they will lose Siad Barre's friendship. If they do not, the Ethiopian Revolution will founder.” They eventually lost Somalia’s friendship, and the Ethiopian revolution held.
The full transcript of the discussion at the House of the Central Committee in Berlin is available via Wilson Center Digital Archive. Most of the text is below but I cut out parts not directly related to Castro’s intervention on the Ogaden dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia:
Before my departure from Aden we discussed with the PDRY leadership the need to do everything possible to arrive at an understanding between Somalia and Ethiopia. I was well received in Somalia. I had asked them not to have any public demonstrations. Siad Barre was very friendly during our first dinner. Prior to my arrival, I had received his reply to a letter of mine regarding the question of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. I had also sent an envoy to Somalia for discussions with Vice President Samantar and Interior Minister Suleiman. Samantar held to leftist positions, while Suleiman was a representative of the right wing. The discussion of our representative with him was very severe. I had already received considerable information in the PDRY regarding the situation in Somalia. The power and influence of the rightist group continue to increase. The Interior Minister, Suleiman, is doing everything possible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia and the imperialist countries. Samantar is losing influence. Everything seems to indicate that he is being driven into a corner by the right.
My first evening I wanted to clarify my thoughts about Siad Barre and the Somali revolution. No serious political discussion took place at this dinner; [Siad] Barre explained to me the evolution of the Somali revolution. The next day, we had an extensive sight-seeing program. We went to a Cuban-built militia training center, an agricultural school, a school for nomad children, etc. We were taken around for hours, although we had not yet had a political discussion, and a mass demonstration had been scheduled at noon in the stadium. I understood that they wanted to avoid such a conversation prior to the demonstration. As the demonstration began, Siad Barre and I had still not had a private conversation, and because of this I was very careful. Siad Barre was very arrogant and severe; maybe he wanted to intimidate us. In my speech to the mass meeting I talked about imperialist policy in the Middle East, the reactionary role of Saudi Arabia, and the actions of other reactionary powers. I did this even though I knew that there was a considerable trend in the country in favor of closer relations with these countries. I talked about the PLO's struggle, the Ethiopian revolution, and the Libyan revolution, and of progressive Algeria that they want to isolate. I talked about Mozambique, and only at the end about how imperialism is doing everything to reverse the progressive order in Somalia. Siad Barre introduced me to participants of the mass meeting without saying a political word.
Before the mass meeting they had played half of a soccer game. It is unknown whether the soccer game was simply an appendage to the demonstration or vice versa. My speech went against the right wing tendencies and supported the left wing. We observed that almost all of the Central Committee members applauded, with the exception of Suleiman and his people. Samantar was very satisfied, and even Siad Barre seemed content. Nevertheless, the mass meeting was not broadcast live on radio or TV.
Only that evening did we begin to discuss specific problems, at my residence. It was clear to me that we had to be careful because surely the interior minister had installed bugs. This same evening Siad Barre finally talked about Ethiopia. He compared it to the Tsarist Empire and said that Ethiopia was the only surviving colonial power. Thanks to Lenin's wisdom, the Tsarist Empire had disappeared, but it lived on in Ethiopia. He had proposed to the Ethiopians, some time ago, to establish a federation or even a unification of the two countries. Ethiopia had not reacted then, but was now itself proposing this solution. He spoke very enthusiastically about his efforts to reach a solution with Ethiopia. I used the occasion to tell Siad Barre that I would travel to Ethiopia the next day and asked him if he would be willing to meet with Mengistu. He agreed.
The next day I flew on to Ethiopia. We had earlier agreed that there would be no great reception for me, since at the time they were still fighting the civil war. Shots constantly rang out. Mengistu took me to the old Imperial Palace and the negotiations began on the spot. I found the information that I already had to be confirmed. We continued our negotiations on the following day. Naturally we had to take extensive security precautions. The Ethiopians had come up with a division, and I had brought a company of Cuban soldiers with me. The day of my arrival there were rumors of a coup. It did not happen.
I developed the impression that there was a real revolution taking place in Ethiopia. In this former feudal empire, lands were being distributed to the peasants. Each farmer got 10 hectares. There were also reforms in the cities. It was established that each citizen could only own one house. Plots were made available for housing construction.
...
I asked Mengistu whether he was willing to meet with Siad Barre in Aden. We agreed. After concluding my talks I flew on to Aden.
Siad Barre had arrived in Aden that morning. Mengistu did not arrive until the afternoon. I had a conversation with Siad Barre in which he bared his claws. He told me that if Mengistu was a real revolutionary he should do as Lenin, and withdraw from his territory. Siad Barre took a very hard position. I asked him whether he felt that there had been no real revolution in Ethiopia and that Mengistu was not a real leftist leader. He told me that there had been no revolution in Ethiopia. While in Mogadishu he had shown me a map of Greater Somalia in which half of Ethiopia had been annexed.
...
When the meeting started, Siad Barre immediately began speaking. Siad Barre is a general who was educated under colonialism. The revolution in Somalia is led by generals who all became powerful under colonial times. I have made up my mind about Siad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist. Chauvinism is the most important factor in him. Socialism is just an outer shell that is supposed to make him more attractive. He has received weapons from the socialist countries and his socialist doctrine is [only] for the masses. The Party is there only to support his personal power.
In his case there is a bizarre symbiosis of rule by military men who went through the school of colonialism and social appearances. Something about socialism appeals to him, but overall there is still a lot of inequality and unfairness in the country. His principal ideas are nationalism and chauvinism, not socialism.
His goal is old fashioned politics: sweet, friendly words. Siad Barre speaks like a wise man; only he speaks. He is different from the many political leaders that I know. [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat, [Algerian President Houari] Boumedienne, [Mozambique President Samora] Machel, [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto and many others are strong characters. They can also listen and do not take a dogmatic attitude. One can speak with them. Siad Barre really thinks that he is at the summit of wisdom. Until now everything has gone smoothly for him. The Italians and the British made him a general. The revolution was accomplished in a minute, with hardly a shot fired. He put on a socialist face and got economic aid and weapons from the Soviet Union. His country is important strategically, and he likes prestige. Barre is very convinced of himself. His socialist rhetoric is unbearable. He is the greatest socialist; he cannot say ten words without mentioning socialism.
With this tone he began to speak in the meeting with Mengistu. He began giving a lecture on Ethiopia and demanded from Mengistu to do as Lenin had done: do away with the Ethiopian Empire. Mengistu remained quiet; he said that Ethiopia was ready and willing to find a solution and that there needed to be the first concrete steps on both sides to achieve a rapprochement.
With this tone he began to speak in the meeting with Mengistu. He began giving a lecture on Ethiopia and demanded from Mengistu to do as Lenin had done: do away with the Ethiopian Empire. Mengistu remained quiet; he said that Ethiopia was ready and willing to find a solution and that there needed to be the first concrete steps on both sides to achieve a rapprochement.
Siad Barre theatrically responded that he was disappointed with Mengistu and that he displayed the same attitude as the Ethiopian Emperor. The Ethiopian revolutionary leadership had the same mentality as Haile Selassie. The meeting had begun at 11 PM and a solution was not in sight.
[Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez then proposed the establishment of a standing commission with representatives from Ethiopia, Somalia and the PDRY to find ways to a solution. All the other participants drafted us against our will into this commission.
Siad Barre carried on with his great wise man act, as the great Socialist, the great Marxist. At the same time he spoke demagogically as only one member of the "collective leadership" with a mandate from the Politburo and the need to consult with them on all matters. After a brief recess for consultations with his delegation he proposed direct talks between Mengistu and himself.
Mengistu, who had already become more insulted and mistrustful during Siad Barre's previous statements, said that he was willing to do so, but not at this time. First the question of the commission had to be resolved.
We continued the meeting at 3.15 in the morning. Siad Barre had prepared the text of an agreement in which the idea of the commission was accepted but which directed that its main purpose should be to solve the outstanding territorial questions between Somalia and Ethiopia. The commission would thus take this approach from the start. How were the Ethiopians supposed to react to such a provocative proposal?
During the break I had spoken with Mengistu, who did not hide his rejection of Siad Barre. I also spoke with Siad Barre and asked him whether he was really interested in finding a solution. He said that Mengistu would have to answer that. He went on with his revolutionary rhetoric, about how real socialists, revolutionaries, and Marxists could not deny realities. He said that Mengistu was in fact a drastic man, one who has taken drastic measures: why could he not decide similarly drastically right here and now to resolve the question?
In this setting I was faced with the complicated question of either speaking my mind about Siad Barre's position or keeping it to myself.
I concluded that I had to speak out for the following reasons:
1. Keeping quiet would have meant endorsing the chauvinistic policy of Somalia, and its consequences. It would also have meant supporting the rightists in Somalia.
2. Not responding to Siad Barre would mean that any subsequent aid from socialist countries to Ethiopia, no matter how small, would be termed by Siad Barre as a betrayal.
3. In what kind of a situation would this put the PDRY, about to support Ethiopia with tanks, trucks and artillery with the help of a Soviet ship?
In addition, Siad Barre had not only been insulting, he was resorting to subtle threats. At a certain point he said that one could not know where all of this could lead.
Because of this, I spoke up. I explained that Siad Barre did not believe that there had been a real revolution in Ethiopia, that the events of 3 February had totally answered this question and that Mengistu was a revolutionary leader. I went on to say that we considered the events in Ethiopia as a revolution, that the events of 3 February were a turning point, and that Mengistu is the leader of a profound transformation. I declared that we could not possibly agree with Siad Barre's position. I said that Siad Barre's position represented a danger to the revolution in Somalia, endangered the revolution in Ethiopia, and that as a result there was a danger of isolating the PDRY. In particular I emphasized that Siad Barre's policies were aiding the right wing in Somalia itself in its efforts against socialism, and to deliver Somalia into the arms of Saudi Arabia and Imperialism.
I said that these policies were weakening Somalia's relations with the socialist countries and would have to lead to the collapse of the revolution in Somalia. I appealed to Siad Barre's and the entire Somali leadership's sense of historical responsibility. I said that I did not think that this would come to a war between Somalia and Ethiopia but that I was worried, since war would be a very serious thing. I do not believe that there are people who would provoke a war between the peoples.
Immediately after my speaking so frankly, Siad Barre took the floor. He said that he would never want war and that as a socialist and revolutionary he would never take this path. If the socialist camp wanted to cut itself off from Somalia then that was the affair of the socialist camp. I had put pressure on him, Siad Barre, but not demanded from Mengistu, to come to this meeting.
Now, I pointed out that I had supported the summit between Siad Barre and Mengistu but did not talk about Siad Barre's insults vis-a-vis Mengistu. I said that Cuba had no intention of cutting itself off from the Somali Revolution, rather, we supported it. The whole meeting ended without any results.
If we now give our aid to Ethiopia, Siad Barre will have no moral right to accuse us of betrayal, etc. I told him very clearly that there was a revolution in Ethiopia and that we had to help it.
In any case I had detected during my meetings with Siad Barre a certain irritation on his part with the Soviet Union. He was agitated that the Soviet Union was not delivering spare parts or tractors and that oil came too late from the Soviet Union, in spite of repeated promises. The Soviet ambassador has explained the state of affairs to us. The Somalis were repeatedly changing their minds about their requests, which had delayed the matter. In addition, unfortunately the Soviet oil tanker had sunk on its way to Somalia.
As I told Siad Barre this, he called the Soviets liars. He said this was not the position of the Soviet politburo, but rather the result of sabotage by bureaucrats. His irritation and criticism of the Soviet Union also showed in other cases. He went on to say that there was not enough drinkable water in his country and that cattle were dying, the bananas were ripening too late, all because the pumps provided by the Soviets did not work.
Because of this attitude of Siad Barre I see a great danger. That is why I considered it appropriate to give you my impressions truthfully, without euphemisms. I wanted to discuss my point of view frankly. The socialist countries are faced with a problem. If they help Ethiopia, they will lose Siad Barre's friendship. If they do not, the Ethiopian Revolution will founder. That was the most important thing about these matters.
[Castro went on to brief Erich Honecke on his travels across North Africa and the Middle East]