The USSR is unlikely to back such an 'unpromising state', US briefing says of Somalia
Moscow would go onto become one of Somalia's most committed backers
Somalia was a country adrift towards the end of the 1960s. Its economy was in dire straits, its military was weak and the romance of independence hadn’t translated in ways that inspired much hope among the population. By the late 1960s, Somalia’s president had been assassinated, the military had taken over, the country was politically unstable and lacked a superpower patron, while all its neighbours – particularly its regional rival Ethiopia – could reliably count on the west.
It was in that context that the CIA put together a snapshot of the region as a whole with a great deal of focus on Somalia, the country most unhappy with its postcolonial borders that had also expressed an interest in revising them. The document says it is dated May 1970, just a few months after Siad Barre came to power in a military coup and is a decent primer on the geopolitical arena he had to operate in and the resources which were at his disposal.
The analysis is actually pretty good and correctly predicts a future Somali invasion of Ethiopia in the event that Ethiopia falls into civil strife. Siad Barre, the leader of the Somalia at the time is also described as an “opportunist” who was seeking to expand his control of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), the group of soldiers who took control of the country. He would go onto cultivate a cult of personality. And of the the most striking prediction was this: “They may also be unsure of the staying power of the present regime, and wary of overly close identification with a possible early loser.” Though the regime probably lasted a lot longer than they anticipated, by 1991, it was no more.
At other times the document is wrong, extremely disparaging, and underestimates the determination of the junta. The SRC for example had no leanings towards “Islamic puritanism”, it was a nascent socialist regime which at various times was hostile to faith in Somalia.
In a disparaging sentence which underlines the complacency of the Washington, the author writes: “The Soviets are undoubtedly reluctant to assume the burdens of keeping afloat such an unpromising state.” Somalia would go on to become one of Moscow’s principal allies in Africa. Elsewhere the author writes: “Somalia has the advantage unique in Africa of ethnic and religious homogeneity, but few other assets.” Its strategic location clearly didn’t interest him much. A link to the full brief can be found here.
III. SOMALIA
28. Somalia has the advantage unique in Africa of ethnic and religious homogeneity, but few other assets. It is much smaller and poorer than Ethiopia. A large portion of its nearly 3 million inhabitants—another 850,000 Somalis reside in Ethiopia and Kenya—are nomads, and only a few are settled farmers. Others are semi-employed urban dwellers. Many of the Somali nomads roam freely across borders in seasonal migrations to watering places in Kenya, Ethiopia, and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. The relatively democratic system of government which prevailed since independence in 1960 was shaken by election frauds and corruption prior to being swept away last fall by a military coup. Currently a cumbersome 24-man group of army and police officers, calling itself the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), is attempting to rule the country. Its leading figure, General Siad, is an opportunist whose political skills are now being tested. Since the coup he has gradually assumed greater authority in the council, though his views may not always prevail.
29. Given the awkwardness of government by revolutionary council, the limited abilities and experience of its youthful members, and the intractable national problems, it is hardly surprising that the regime has provided little sense of direction. It is still uncertain of what to do with its civilian predecessors, now held in detention. It is also aware that some important clans believe themselves inadequately represented in government, and are likely to make their discontent more evident in some fashion. Moreover, the SRC faces severe economic problems, brought on by drought, a recession in the small modern sector, and diminished government revenues. Even in better times, Somalia depended heavily upon outside assistance, of which an annual Italian donation to meet budgetary expenses was most important. The Italian subsidy continues, but other foreign aid has fallen off. The multiplicity of economic and social problems faced by the SRC and tribal, generational, and ideological tensions within the government suggest further instability and change.
30. The SRC, like its counterparts in Libya and Sudan which also came on the scene in 1969, is fiercely nationalistic, with some leanings toward Islamic puritanism. The regime is also much more susceptible than its predecessor to radical Arab blandishments. Somalis do not normally consider themselves part of the Arab world, but Islamic ties are stronger than ever and of more interest to the SRC than relations with black Africa. Perhaps also, some of the Somali overtures to the Arabs are motivated by hopes of getting money from an oil-rich Arab state.
31. Unlike the previous regime, which was officially non-aligned but with a tilt to the West, the SRC has taken several actions aggravating relations with the US including the expulsion of the Peace Corps. In December 1969, the expulsion of five embassy officials in May 1970, and the nationalization of some foreign businesses also in May. Some SRC members evidently believe that the US is plotting to do them in. In part this stems from the close relations between the US and former Prime Minister Eo2 [not sure who?] now under arrest. It also derives from the US role as arms supplier to the archenemy, Ethiopia, and is probably encouraged by Soviet advisors in Mogadiscio. Yet, although some SRC members urge a break in relations with the US; others are hopeful of retaining US economic aid, as well as an image of non-alignment. At the moment a modest US presence is tolerated, but this may change for the worse.
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*The US since 1954 has extended approximately $72 million in economic aid to Somalia, and is setting aside some $1.9 million for FY 1971.
32. The position of the USSR in Somalia is quite different. Although the Russians have furnished $63 million in economic aid, and $35 million in military aid, it is the latter which affords them easy entree into the offices of the SRC. Soviet involvement with the Somali Army began in 1963. The Somali Government, at that time facing a relatively well-armed Ethiopia in a bitter dispute over the Ogaden, made a futile attempt to get arms and training from a number of countries, East and West. The Soviets made an offer, perhaps to forestall a Chinese bid. Since then, the USSR has provided virtually all weapons and training for the Somali Army. Many of the officers on the SRC have been trained in Soviet military academies, but not all are considered pro-Soviet.
33. Somali foreign policy pronouncements are a curious mixture of strident assertions of independence, denunciation of neocolonialism, and praise for the USSR. The SRC extended diplomatic recognition to East Germany (among the first black African states to do so), made port facilities available to Soviet naval vessels, and outdid itself in celebrating the Lenin Centenary. Much of this is clearly designed to induce the Soviets to provide more aid. Shortly after the coup a Soviet delegation toured Somalia. It saw the dismal results of past economic aid—faltering state farms, under-utilized factories, and a fish processing facility which has not yet proved to be of value. There is still no announcement of new aid, economic or military, from Moscow, though the Somali needs are daily becoming more pressing. The Soviets are undoubtedly reluctant to assume the burdens of keeping afloat such an unpromising state. They may also be unsure of the staying power of the present regime, and wary of overly close identification with a possible early loser.
34. Thus far the SRC has not defined its position on the Greater Somalia issue, either because it is too unsure of its own stability, or because it is divided on the matter. The previous government's detente policy was not popular with a good many Somalis, including most of the military. But not all of those who reject detente are keen on instigating insurgencies in Somali inhabited lands across the borders. The various attempts to stir up trouble in these lands in the past have not helped the Greater Somali cause, and have left a heritage of tensions and distrust. We believe that the SRC, if it can hold power over the next year or two, will make some gestures in the direction of irredentism, such as a resumption of propaganda aiming at the unity of all Somalis or a clandestine training program for cross-border insurgents. It is doubtful, however, that the SRC would promote active insurgency in these areas unless more favorable conditions came about. Such favorable circumstances would include the withdrawal of France from the TFAI, and the deaths of Haile Selassie and President Kenyatta of Kenya, should these events lead to civil conflict.
35. Essentially, the Greater Somalia concept runs counter to the general African dictum on inviolability of borders. Somali claims to territory of their neighbors are simply incompatible with the national policies of Kenya and Ethiopia. If Somalia resumes efforts to gain control of these lands, whether directly or through now dormant "liberation fronts," hostilities with the neighboring lands would ensue. If Somali armed forces were not so obviously inferior to those of Ethiopia, or of Kenya in league with Ethiopia, the danger in the Horn would be much greater. Distances, poor roads, and inadequate logistic capabilities of all armies in the area also weigh heavily as factors inhibiting open war. Yet, the tensions persist, Somalis are not likely soon to give up their irredentist dreams, and opportunities across the frontiers in Kenya and Ethiopia may tempt the Somalis into an adventure.
VI. SOVIET INTERESTS
45. Soviet strategic interests in the Horn of Africa are associated with but clearly subordinate to their involvement in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Soviet activities in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean contribute to their interest in the Horn. This is further enhanced by the fact that, since the closing of the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden provides the only access to the Red Sea. Visits to ports in Somalia, Sudan, and South Yemen are becoming more frequent and serve to remind the local regimes of Soviet interest in their lands and to demonstrate Soviet power. Another, and perhaps more important, instrument of Soviet policy is the provision of military aid to Somalia and Sudan. In the case of Somalia, it is this type of aid which has afforded the USSR a strong measure of influence with the military rulers.
46. A primary Soviet objective in the Horn, as in much of the Third World, is to deny the area to the West, but it is difficult to discern much beyond that. Soviet opportunities in Somalia and Sudan are more promising at the moment, but the Russians have not neglected Addis Ababa. Undoubtedly, they would like to have the US base at Kagnew removed. But they have apparently given no direct aid to the ELF, nor do they issue threats to Ethiopia. Rather, they are endeavoring to retain the good will of Haile Selassie, even though they are arming his enemies. When the Emperor complains to Moscow of its arms shipments and training of Somalis, he is told that he, too, can receive Russian arms if he wishes. Probably a condition would be to reduce the American presence. The USSR, meanwhile, is biding its time, offering further economic aid from the credit line of $100 million—extended to Ethiopia in 1959 but only scantily drawn upon. The Soviets seem to be counting on opportunities to gain influence or oust the US after Haile Selassie's death. It is unlikely that they will succeed in doing so.
47. Soviet aid to Somalia and Sudan has not cost a great deal either in money, personnel, or damaged relations with Ethiopia. Nor have they done much over the years to take advantage of their strong position in Somalia. Western scientists have speculated that Somalia would be a useful site for major Soviet space tracking or monitoring installations. Apparently the USSR is not presently interested in using its influence in Somalia in this way. Thus far, it has managed to reduce Western influences in Sudan and Somalia, and that is probably sufficient satisfaction to Moscow at this time. Perhaps at some point the Soviets would find it useful to seek naval, air, or sophisticated space tracking facilities in these countries. At the moment they have the use of Aden as a port of call, which is better equipped than the ports of Somalia and Sudan. The Soviets rely mainly on their own lines of supply for support and apparently make port visits mainly for political reasons. Soviet combat ships have visited Somalia more than any other country in the area.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
48. The great uncertainty in the Horn is the aftermath of the Emperor's death. We think that a successor government would continue to look to the US as its primary backer, if only because the Soviets are deeply involved with the enemies of the Empire. If a successor regime faces some difficulty from internal or external challenges, as seems likely, it would look to the US for additional, emergency support including arms and petroleum, and would probably make subsequent judgments on the continuation of US use of Kagnew largely on the basis of the American response.
49. The US lease on Kagnew Station runs through 1978. In a day when military bases of the Great Powers in African countries are generally unwelcome, there is virtually no clamor in Ethiopia against the installation. It is a communications and scientific research base and is publicized as such—with some effect, apparently—in the area. In Eritrea, its contribution to the economy has a significant influence on its acceptability. Propaganda blasts from Communist, Arab, and ELF media will certainly continue to hammer at the foreign base theme, particularly after the US withdrawal from Wheelus base in Libya. But this is likely to have little effect on Haile Selassie. Nor do we think that the ELF is now considering hostile activity against Kagnew, but there is a danger that the ELF command will slide into anti-Americanism, and order hostile actions against Kagnew.
50. In the chronically tense atmosphere of the Horn, there is always a strong risk of a minor incident escalating into a larger conflict. The US no longer has much influence in Somalia or Sudan, but does have a potential capability for restraining Ethiopian military action. So far as we can determine, the USSR is not encouraging Somalia and Sudan towards more bellicose positions. Indeed, it would be awkward for both the US and the USSR, if a conflict broke out between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Ethiopians would look to Washington for moral and materiel support, and the US would face some difficult policy decisions.
51. Although the US need for Kagnew is a factor in our present interests in the Horn, there is the broader question of the US position in Ethiopia. There are few US investments there, though the potential for development is considered promising. Access to Ethiopian airfields and ports is potentially of great value to the US. In a broader sense, a stable Ethiopia is a kind of linchpin for conservative forces in the area, e.g., Kenya, and Saudi Arabia. Also a strong US presence in a major African country probably helps encourage moderate, pro-Western views in Africa as a whole.