US cannot arm Somalia as fighting with Ethiopia continues, said Zbigniew Brzezinski
The Carter administration refused to capitalise on a breakdown in ties between Moscow and Mogadishu when he chose not to arm Somalia during the Ogaden War
As the war between Somalia and Ethiopia raged on through the winter of 1977 and Somalia came up against a brick wall of opposition in the two major capitals during the Cold War era Somalia began scrambling to find a superpower patron.
Jimmy Carter had come to power defeating Republican Gerald Ford in a presidential election earlier that year and was probably surprised that one of the major foreign policy challenges he’d have to manage was a conflict over a remote desert in the Horn of Africa. In his book The Cold War: A Global History Odd Arne Westad observes that when Carter moved into the White House the USSR appeared to be on the ascendance.
“Seen from a Soviet perspective, the global situation in the mid-1970s could indeed seem hopeful… Syria and Iraq were working more closely with the Soviets. South Yemen was a People’s Republic. All the freshly independent African counties were governed by Marxist-Leninists. Vietnam was re-unified under Communist rule. India had become a Soviet ally. In Somalia, across from Yemen on the Horn of Africa, the Revolutionary Socialist Party held power and invited the Soviet navy to station ships at the port of Berbera. Internationally things looked good for the Soviet Union.”
Having lost Soviet support during the war Somalia sensed an opportunity to cosy up to the US, in a broadly forbidding situation for the incoming Carter administration. In a bid to lobby the US government following a rupture in ties with Somalia’s old partner the Soviet Union, Hussein Abdulkadir Kassim, Somalia’s minerals and water resources minister, called US national security adviser and Cold War hawk Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Kassim was aiming to persuade Brzezinski that the Soviet Union had an elaborate plan to destabilise the entire Horn of Africa region. Brzezinski was reticent, explaining that the US had sympathy for Somalia’s concerns about Moscow’s intentions but wasn’t prepared to become a party to a territorial conflict. A cable of their discussion was made public by Wikileaks.
1. Somali minister of minerals and water resources, chief of the Somali Goodwill Delegation to the United States sent by President Siad, called on Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski on December 8, 1977.
2. In presenting Somalia’s case, Minister Kassim covered in general the same ground that he did with Secretary Vance (see Reftel). He did, however, come somewhat closer to admitting the presence of Somali troops in the Ogaden fighting, saying at one point, “Our fighting in the Ogaden has depleted our resources considerably.”
3. Dr. Brzezinski questioned Kassim closely concerning his statement that the Soviets had a definite plan for the destabilization of the entire region. Brzezinski asked if Kassim’s thesis was not based on an intelligent inference as to Soviet aims rather than precise knowledge of a plan? Hussein insisted that the plan was a real one and the evidence clearly pointed in that direction.
4. While expressing sympathy with Minister Kassim’s larger concern for the area as a whole, Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that we did not believe it was wise for the US to encourage large-scale territorial conflict. He said that while the United States did not want to facilitate an Ethiopian conquest of Somalia, on the other hand, there was the very real problem of territorial integrity. The US would prefer to see the Ogaden problem solved peacefully and was anxious that the OAU [Organisation of African Unity - precursor to the African Union] efforts to mediate be successful. We would prefer that all foreign powers cease from supplying arms and especially the supplying of “specialists” for use in the area. The US believes the confidential confidential page 03 State 301323 OAU effort to mediate is in Somalia's own best interests.
5. Brzezinski said the US wished for a solution that separated the Ogaden conflict from any effect it might have on Somalia itself. He promised to report the conversation to the President who, he reminded Kassim, took a close personal interest in the affairs of the Horn of Africa.
6. Final call on Dr. Brzezinski by Minister Kassim was scheduled on 16 December. Dr. Brzezinski could not, however, receive the Minister because he was involved in the [Menachem] Begin (Israel’s prime minister) meetings. The Vice-President greeted the Minister and his colleagues in the White House lobby, and they were then escorted into Dr. Brzezinski's office where David Aaron held a brief conversation with them which constituted, in effect, an answer to Siad’s letter to President Carter. Aaron followed the same scenario that Dr. Brzezinski covered in his meeting, stressing our friendly feelings for the Somalis, stating flatly that we could not provide arms while fighting continued, but that we would provide economic assistance and concluding by recommending strongly to Minister Kassim that the Somalis take a “peace initiative” to demonstrate their goodwill and counter the effect of the Soviet airlift to Ethiopia. He stressed that they should strive to get African help in initiating negotiations. Henze, who also participated in the Aaron meeting, reminded Kassim that an effort to improve relations with Kenya and reassure Kenya of Somalia's respect for Kenya’s territorial integrity would make a favorable impression in the United States as well as in Africa. Vance confidential.