US intelligence note provides analysis of the 1969 military coup
One of the last governments in Africa with elected civilian leaders has been turned over to military rule, writes George C. Denney, Jr.
“A force of cavalry will always find unguarded camels” – Somali proverb
It took a few days until the dust settled on the military coup in October in 1969 which saw Somalia’s elected government dissolved. It wasn’t entirely clear to many outside observers who was in charge or what the coup would mean for Somalia’s positioning in global politics. Abdirizak Haji Hussein, one of Somalia’s former prime ministers clearly articulated the spirit which animated his country’s foreign policy prior to the coup in a pithy statement to Time magazine in which he said: “We Somalis are neither pro-Eastern nor pro-Western, we are ardently for ourselves.” Even though Barre later paid lip-service to being non-aligned, he threw his lot in with the socialist camp.
But if developments elsewhere in Africa were anything to go by Mogadishu would likely shun the west and pursue closer ties with the Soviet Union. George C. Denney, Jr, a US intelligence staffer provided analysis of the coup for his colleagues in Washington in an Intelligence Note, the text of which has been declassified by the State department. The note predicted that the coup could further splinter Somali society along clan lines ushering in a “period of serious unrest.” That wasn’t correct in the short-term but Somalia still hasn’t totally recovered from the consequences of three decades of military rule after government collapse in 1991.
The note opens with a Somali proverb as its epitaph which summarises the US view on the coup: “A force of cavalry will always find unguarded camels.” The text can be read in full below:
The apparently bloodless coup which overthrew the government of Somalia came within 24 hours of the burial of assassinated President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and put an end to the efforts of civilian politicians to reach agreement on a new president. One of the last states in Africa with legitimate claim to a democratic system of government has now turned to military rule. The takeover is likely to endanger the politically courageous attempt, launched two years ago by Shermarke and his Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, to ease Somalia's irredentist problems through detente with Kenya and Ethiopia.
The Coup
The army moved early on October 21, 1969, to seize control of the government, the radio, transport centers and other key installations. Later, a Revolutionary Council, composed of army and police, proclaimed a state of emergency, dissolved the National Assembly, and suspended the Constitution. All ministers – presumably including Egal – are under house arrest. The Revolutionary Council announced over the Radio Mogadiscio that it would "respect all treaties and agreements made with friendly nations... maintain a policy of non-alignment, self-determination, and non-interference... and provide help and support to all freedom fighters." [I added the bold]
Motivation
Coup leaders claim to have acted in order to put an end to widespread corruption and to "abolish tribalism." The new regime's desire to support freedom fighters suggests that discontent with the detente may also have been a motive.
Leadership
Given the army's power, it is probably the senior partner in its alliance with the police. According to a regime spokesman, Major General Siad Barre, the army commandant, and Major General Jama Ali Korshel, the police commandant, are working closely together on the Council. The names of additional members are not yet available. Siad, an outspoken critic of detente, and Korshel may have engineered the coup or may turn out to be figureheads for a younger group of officers.
Implications
In defiance of Egal's policy, Siad's army has in the past, undercut the detente with Ethiopia by convertly arming Arussi Galla rebels operation in Southwestern Ethiopia. It is generally believed that most army officers, and perhaps a number of police, have looked unfavourably upon detente. As a consequence, a return to the expansionist policies of the pre-Egal era may be in store. Even should a newly-emergent group of army leaders be willing to experiment further with the detente, they would encounter reawakened Ethiopian suspicions.
The coup may also provide increased opportunities for the Soviets. A large percentage of army officers have undergone training in the Soviet Union. While it is doubtful that a significant number are communists, many may be susceptible to Soviet influence. Furthermore, army officers have long yearned for more sophisticated military equipment to offset Ethiopia's superior forces and may now wish to acquire greater military aid from the Soviets. The Soviets might well comply with the request of an irredentist Somali regime, particularly in view of the American presence in ethiopia.
Somalia's nomadic tribes are heavily armed and could resist army authority. Moreover, the army is tribally divided and could itself be hard put to maintain its unity should serious tribal disorders develop. The emergence of tribal tension, ever present in Somalia, coupled with the political upheavals of recent days could usher in a period of serious unrest.